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a b  s  t  r a  c t
Taking the  assumptions  of the  resource  dependency theory as  our starting  point, the  main  objective
of this investigation  is  to gain an  understanding  of how  and in what way  board members  who  serve
on  multiple  boards  (interlocks)  can  affect a  firm’s profitability, and whether  it is  useful  to consider the
derivation  of these  interlocks  according to the  type  of board  member  (executive or  non-executive)  who
possesses  them. Using  dynamic panel data  analysis  (GMM) and  a sample  of 88  firms quoted  on  the
Spanish Continuous  Market for the  period  2005–2008, our results confirm  the  existence  of a curvilinear
(inverted-U) relation  between  interlocks and firm  performance. The results  demonstrate  that  this  relation
is  only  significant if  we  include  the  total  number of external  ties  rather  than just  the  number  of  links
generated by  non-executive directors. We  can  also  confirm that the  degree  of familiarity  and shared
knowledge  between board members  (measured  by average board tenure) affects this  relationship.
©  2015  AEDEM.  Published by  Elsevier  España, S.L.U.  This is an open  access article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
¿Es  útil  diferenciar  a  los  interlocks  de  acuerdo  con  el  tipo  de  consejero
(ejecutivo  o  no  ejecutivo)  que  los  posee?  Su  influencia  sobre  el  rendimiento
de  la  empresa
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Consejos de administración
Interlocks
Permanencia del consejo
Rendimiento de la empresa
r  e  s u  m e  n
Partiendo de  los supuestos  de  la teoría  de  dependencia  de  recursos,  el  principal objetivo  de  esta  inves-
tigación pasa por conocer cómo y  de  qué forma  la pertenencia  de  los consejeros  a múltiples  consejos
(interlocks)  podría  afectar a la rentabilidad  de  la empresa y  si es importante  considerar en esta relación
la procedencia  de  los  interlocks  según  la tipología  del  consejero  que  lo  ostente (consejeros  ejecutivos
y  no ejecutivos).  Mediante  un  análisis de  datos de panel  dinámico  (GMM),  y  a  través  de  una muestra
de  88  empresas  cotizadas  en  el Mercado  Continuo espan˜ol para el  periodo 2005–2008,  los resultados
obtenidos  confirman  que existe  una relación  curvilínea (en forma  de  U invertida) entre  los interlocks  y  el
rendimiento de  la  empresa,  y que  esta  relación  es sólo  significativa  si  tenemos  en  cuenta el  número  total
de  vínculos  externos,  y  no sólo cuando tomamos  en  número  de  vínculos  generados  por  los consejeros
no-ejecutivos.  Asimismo,  podemos  afirman  que  el grado de familiaridad  y conocimiento  mutuo entre los
miembros  del consejo  (medido  por la  permanencia  media del  consejo)  influye sobre esta  relación.
©  2015 AEDEM.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España, S.L.U.  Este  es un artículo Open Access  bajo  la  licencia
CC BY-NC-ND  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: lcalero@upo.es (L. Pérez-Calero Sánchez).
Introduction
The board of directors can be  viewed as a source of compet-
itive advantage for an organisation, since it provides access to
valuable external resources and allows the firm to respond to
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.redee.2015.04.001
1019-6838/© 2015 AEDEM. Published by  Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CC  BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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outside events (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wincent, Anokhin, & Boter,
2009). Studies based on the resource provision role of the board
have generally focused on the external connections brought by
the directors; the ties to other firms created by  their joint board
membership, known as interlocking directorates, are  the most
commonly used in the literature (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002;
Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Hillman &  Dalziel, 2003; Kor &
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Nahapiet &  Ghoshal, 1998; Ortiz, Aragón,
Delgado, & Ferrón, 2012).
Prior studies have sought to understand how the resources
brought by board members via their interlocks affect a firm’s per-
formance and have proposed both positive (Kim & Cannella, 2008)
and negative (Goerzen &  Beamish, 2005) relations, and reached
a  variety of conclusions. These inconsistent results are  due to, in
the majority of cases, the existence of different types of interlocks,
and the different effects these  have on the firms’ performance and
strategies. For example, Davis (1991) examine how a firm’s inter-
locks formed with other companies that  have adopted poison pill
strategies in the past, increasing the likelihood of the firm adopting
similar tactics; Shipilov, Greve, and Rowley, (2010) analyse how the
adoption of a practice by one organisation is positively influenced
by the accumulated adoption of the same practice by its interlock-
ing  firm; and finally, Diestre, Rajagopalan, and Dutta (2014) exam-
ine how board members’ experience in  a specific market increases
the likelihood of an interlocking firm entering that new market.
However, despite attempts in the literature to classify the
various types of interlocks, the majority of studies ignore any
distinction according to origin (from executive or non-executive
directors); they are examined implicitly, with little awareness of
the importance of the ties brought by non-executive directors
(Certo, 2003; Filatotchev, 2006; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Kor
& Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011), and
ignoring the rich potential of the links formed by executive direc-
tors. Firms need to appoint non-executive board members who  will
bring new resources and knowledge to  the top management team
(TMT) (Kor & Misanyi, 2008). This is not to say, however, that the
resources brought by  executive directors should be ignored, espe-
cially when they also contribute new resources and knowledge
derived from their external ties, and in  particular through their
interlocks.
The composition of the board is affected by the age and sta-
bility of the firms in  its sector and thus the majority of the top
management team of newly created firms (new ventures) tend to
be  board members. As a result, in  order to verify that the firm’s
decisions are being taken in an appropriate manner, the literature
on  corporate governance is beginning to question whether board
members possess and are contributing sufficient resources, and to
ask whether non-executive directors should be appointed to make
up for the possible failings of its executive directors (Dalziel, Gentry,
& Bowerman, 2011; Knockaert & Ucbasaran, 2013; Knockaert,
Bjornali, & Erikson, 2014). However, in established firms of a  certain
size, the literature takes for granted that it is appropriate to  appoint
non-executive directors. It  considers that non-executive directors
exert an important control over the management, provide support
and advice thanks to their human capital or professional experience
(many board members enjoy a  high professional prestige) and are
able to bring in  resources from outside the firm through their net-
work of contacts (Finegold, Benson, & Hecht, 2007; Kroll, Walters,
& Son, 2007). On  the other hand, influenced by agency theory, the
literature presupposes that executive directors, members of the
top management team (Dalziel et al., 2011), will pursue their own
interests and rewards at the expense of the firm’s shareholders. This
means that little attention has been paid to the external resources
brought by executive directors or the need to study the board as a
group of individuals who contribute valuable and complementary
resources.
We therefore consider it appropriate to  examine the value that
all board members contribute through their interlocks. In this
investigation, we propose that the resources brought by the direc-
tors, regardless of type, enable the firm to  take better decisions,
thanks to their pooled knowledge and experience (Filatotchev,
2006), and that this ultimately affects firm performance.
Finally, by considering the complete set of resources brought by
all of the board members, regardless of type, we  are supporting an
idea that has already been proposed in a  number of studies (Forbes
& Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Stevenson & Radin,
2009; Van Ees,  Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009) that the board should be
viewed in its entirety as a  “group of individuals”, whose effective-
ness depends not  only on the individual resources contributed by
each member, but also on its ability to  act as a  team and to share and
assimilate these resources. The aim of our investigation is to pur-
sue this line of research in greater depth, introducing the moderator
effect of board tenure on the relation between interlocks and firm
performance. A board with high average board tenure encourages
better relations and greater trust between its members (Le, Kroll,
and Walters, 2013), encouraging a  mutual and efficient exchange
of the vision and strategic resources acquired from other firms.
By looking at board tenure therefore, we can analyse the effect of
the degree of familiarity and mutual understanding between board
members and their essential role in  the assimilation and application
of the resources that can be gained through interlocks.
This work is structured as follows: in  the first section we explain
our  choice of subject and set out our objectives. In the subsequent
sections we carry out a literature review that allows us to propose
a set of hypotheses. In the final section we  explain our empiri-
cal study, followed by an analysis and interpretation of the results
obtained.
Literature review and proposed hypotheses
The more traditional literature, based on agency theory (Fama
& Jensen, 1983; Letza, Sun, &  Kirkbride, 2004) identifies the control
function as the board’s principal activity, and assumes that non-
executive board members are more effective than executive board
members in  controlling the senior management and protecting
shareholder interests. This perspective reinforces the particular
importance of the role of non-executive directors in board com-
position. To this can be added the recent financial scandals of
high-profile firms (Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia), which have
reminded us of the importance of board independence, while bring-
ing about a reduction in  the number of executive board members
and giving primacy to the board’s control function. Recent studies
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; Stiles
& Taylor, 2001) consider that new functions should be included,
such as service, or resource provision, this latter being at the
heart of our investigation. These new functions are  founded on
the use of knowledge, information, experience, capabilities, etc.,
namely, the set of resources that each board member brings to  the
board. This new viewpoint affects studies of board composition
by altering the initial perspective: board composition should not
only be viewed in  quantitative terms (percentage of non-executive
directors), but also in qualitative terms, since every board mem-
ber, regardless of type, contributes complementary resources to
the firm, which are required by the group as a whole for effective
decision-making (Certo, 2003; Hillman &  Dalziel, 2003; Westphal
& Fredrickson, 2001).
The resource dependency theory considers that the board of
directors is  an effective mechanism for the firm, in  that its mem-
bers have outside contacts or external links with the environment
(Kim, 2005). Of all the external connections, the relations that have
been studied most frequently by researchers are the ties  to other
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firms through shared board members (interlocking directorates)
(Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Gulati et al., 2000; Hillman & Dalziel,
2003; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Nahapiet &  Ghoshal, 1998; Ortiz
et al., 2012).
Interlocks and their effect on firm performance
The experience that directors acquire by serving on other
boards (interlocks) is  a  valuable resource that enables them
to fulfil their roles more effectively because of their ability to
apply their external experiences (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kor &
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian et al., 2011).  Boards with a  high number
of external connections will benefit from rapid access to  important
external information and critical resources (Kor & Sundaramurthy,
2009). Prior studies have shown that these external connections
play  an important role in the transfer of knowledge and success-
ful practices between firms (Burt & Carlton, 1989; Shipilov et al.,
2010). Firms might also benefit from their directors’ ties, gaining
support from external stakeholders and other influential agents,
which could be critical for the organisation’s performance (Hillman,
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Kiel & Nicholson, 2006). Finally, the
legitimacy of the decisions taken by these firms will also increase
when their directors also serve on the boards of other compa-
nies (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988, 1994; Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart,
2001).
However, despite these benefits, some authors believe that
there are also risks or dangers associated with interlocks (Fligstein,
1995; Palmer, Barber, & Xueguang, 1995). Prior studies have
argued that serving on a  number of boards limits the time and atten-
tion that directors can dedicate to each one and reduces the degree
of  internal cohesion within the board. As  a  result, they suggest that
when board members have a high number of interlocks it could
be damaging to the firm’s performance (Kor & Sundaramurthy,
2009). Therefore, while a  moderate number of external links can
help to improve firm performance, it is  reasonable to suggest that
above a certain level, this positive influence could  become negative,
creating a curvilinear relation (inverted-U) between the number of
board interlocks and the firm’s results.
Finally, as we indicate in  the introduction, the majority of
investigations into the relation between interlocks and firm per-
formance have only studied the links brought by non-executive
directors. However, it is  important to consider the resources
that executive directors contribute through their own external con-
nections. These directors also provide access to  resources and key
information on how other board’s function, which can be directly
applied to the firm’s decision-making processes. Furthermore,
external ties have been linked to  the good reputation of board mem-
bers which, in the case  of executive directors, improves investors’
perceptions of the firm’s decision-makers (Bjornali & Gulbrandsen,
2010; Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Johnson, Schnatterly,
Bolton, & Tuggle 2011; Kim & Cannella, 2008; Shropshire, 2010;
Wincent et al., 2009). Experience obtained from other firms via
a  tie created by  an executive director could be applied directly
to the focal firm’s decision-making, with no need for any kind
of intermediary, and is likely to  increase the transfer of knowl-
edge and successful practices between firms. The risks associated
with an excessive number of external connections, such as the
lack of time and attention paid to the focal firm, would also be
reduced/minimised since executive directors are fully aware of the
firm’s operations because of their own involvement with the man-
agement of the firm.
Therefore, in view of these arguments, we  propose the
following:
H1. There is a curvilinear (inverted-U) relation between (non-
executive and executive) directors’ membership of multiple boards
(interlocks) and firm performance, such that performance will
improve as  the total number of interlocks rises, but then falls as
the total number of interlocks increases.
Following another line of study, Adler and Kwon (2002) sug-
gest that the behaviour of a  group, such as a  board of directors,
is  influenced by its external ties, and also by its ability to work
towards common objectives. These authors make the point that
these two board member relations – external and internal ties –
are not mutually exclusive. Taking these arguments, we propose
that boards with a  high number of external ties also require a high
level of shared knowledge and familiarity between the directors, in
order to facilitate their internal relations and to  mitigate the pos-
sible negative effects of boards with a  high number of interlocks.
With Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009),  we  argue that  experience on
a  particular board gives directors the opportunity to  become more
familiar with the capabilities, habits and personalities of  their fel-
low board members, breaking down barriers between them and
allowing them to  share and apply the resources gained from these
external ties. We therefore propose that board tenure, which refers
to the degree of familiarity and knowledge sharing between board
members during the period that  they serve together on the board,
moderates the relation between a  high number of interlocks and
firm performance.
We therefore propose the following working hypothesis:
H2. Average board tenure moderates the relation (inverted-U)
between directors’ membership of multiple boards and firm per-
formance. Specifically, when average board tenure is high, the
percentage decrease in firm performance (associated with an
increase in the number of external ties) is reduced.
Methodology
Sample and data collection
The sample of firms used in this study comprises Spanish firms
quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange and the Continuous Market
during the period 2005–2008. These firms were chosen because of
their obligation to publish data relating to their corporate gover-
nance and performance. We subsequently eliminated the following
firms: (1) those classified as financial services (if  they included
estate agencies), given the difficulty involved in interpreting all of
the data relating to  that  sector; (2) firms that ceased to be quoted
during the period of analysis (we only included firms that were
quoted on the stock exchange for the entire study period); and (3)
firms for which we  did  not  have access to their annual reports.
Within these limitations, we obtained a total of 94 firms, but from
this total we had to eliminate another six firms that did not  provide
data on their directors’ interlocks, leaving a final sample of  88  firms.
The data on the firms’ results were obtained from the DataS-
tream database and information on board composition was
obtained from the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores
(CNMV, the Spanish Stock Market Commission); from their reports
we were able to access the names of all the board members for
each firm in our  sample – a  total of 3482 directors for the period
2005–2008.
To obtain information relating to each director’s interlocks, we
turned to Axesor,  a  consultancy firm specialising in  the provision of
information on firms and directors, obtained from official registers.
The information from Axesor,  available in  the Official Mercantile
Registry Bulletin (BORME), provided a  list of the ties that each direc-
tor has with one or more boards, in both quoted and unquoted firms,
for each year of the study. To achieve this, we used the start and end
dates corresponding to  the interlock of each board member. Within
these guidelines, the total number of external ties was  14,972.
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The information on our  control variables was  obtained from a
number of sources, depending on whether the variable was  linked
to the firm or the board. At the firm level, the information on firm
size and age was obtained from the Osiris database and the stock
exchange sectoral classification published by  CNMV. Information
at board level regarding the number of directors on each board,
CEO/Chair duality and the type of directors on each board was
obtained from the corporate governance reports published by the
CNMV.
Dependent variable
We  used return on assets (ROA) as our measurement of financial
performance for each firm. We calculated the ROA (with a one-year
lag, ROA+1) as the profit derived from the company’s operations
divided by the firm’s total assets for each year. In general, we con-
sider that countable measures such as ROA reflect the influence
of the internal management more accurately than market-based
measures, which are more susceptible to the influence of exoge-
nous economic factors (Elitzur &  Yaari, 1995; He & Huang, 2011).
Independent and moderator variables
Board tenure is calculated as the average number of years that
board members have served on a  particular board (Golden & Zajac,
2001; Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008;
Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; McIntyre, Murphy, &  Mitchell, 2007).
We define interlocks as the ties that are formed when a  board
member serves on the board of another firm. This measure of
interlocks has previously been used in the literature on boards
(Filatotchev, 2006; Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Kor & Sundaramurthy,
2009; Wincent et al., 2009; Ortiz et al., 2012; Pombo & Gutiérrez,
2011; Tian et al., 2011). Non-executive directors’ interlocks are cal-
culated as the total number of external ties with other firms that are
formed by a board’s non-executive directors. The total number of
interlocks is calculated as the total number of external ties formed
by both executive and non-executive directors with other firms.
Taking the lead from other studies on corporate governance,
we have included the following control variables that might affect
the proposed relations: CEO/Chair duality (Ellstrand, Tihanyi, &
Johnson, 2002; Holm &  Schuler, 2010; Singla, George, & Eliyaht,
2010), measured as a  dummy  variable with the value 1 when the
chief executive of a firm is also Chair of the board and 0 other-
wise; board size (Kim, 2005, 2007; Kroll, Walter, & Wright, 2008;
Ocasio, 1994; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed,
2007), measured as the number of directors on the board; firm
age (Barroso, Villegas, & Pérez-Calero, 2011; Calof, 1993; Zahra
et al., 2007), measured as the number of years since the firm was
founded; percentage of non-executive directors (Datta, Musteen,
& Herrmann, 2009; Filatotchev, Dynomina, Wright, & Buck, 2001;
Singla et al., 2010), calculated as the sum of non-executive direc-
tors on each board divided by the total number of board members;
firm size, measured by  the number of employees in each firm for
each year; and the firm’s previous performance, measured by pre-
vious return on assets (ROA) (Kim, 2005; Tian et al., 2011). Finally,
to control for temporal and sectoral effects, we included dummy
variables for each year (2005–2008) and industry, according to the
stock market industry classification published by  the CNMV.1
1 We have used the information from the  database relating to  the stock mar-
ket  industry classifications proposed by  CNMV, coded as follows: (1) petroleum
and energy; (2) raw materials, industry and construction; (3) consumer goods; (4)
consumer services; (5) financial and property services; and (6) technology and com-
munications. Given the differences in the frequency of the observations for each T
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Table  2
Results of the analysis of non-executive directors’ interlocks versus total interlocks and firm  performance.
Model 1  “baseline model
with control variables”
Model 2 “non-executive
directors’ interlocks”
Model 3 “total
interlocks”
Non-executive directors’ interlocks 1.18
Non-executive directors’ interlocks2 −1.20
Total interlocks 2.78***
Total interlocks2 −2.39**
ROAt−1 1.62 1.54 1.70
*
CEO/Chair duality 0.38 0.36 0.76
Board size 1.31 1.19 −0.10
Firm  age −2.96*** −2.64*** −2.87***
% of non-executive directors 0.51 0.46 0.83
Log firm size −1.08 −1.16 −1.48*
Industry effect YES YES YES
Annual effect YES YES YES
Z1 11.32
* 9.52 14.46*
Z2 28.47
*** 28.14*** 30.68***
m2 0.72 0.70 0.90
Hansen 6.12 5.23 4.27
X2 32.87*** 33.85*** 36.35***
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Statistical estimations
To test our hypotheses we used an estimation process that
is appropriate for our theoretical arguments and robust enough
to withstand the typical problems associated with panel data
analysis. We  therefore used the Arellano–Bond model and used
the generalised methods of moments (GMM)  method (Arellano &
Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Greene, 2003). These authors
propose the use of GMM,  using the lagged values of the origi-
nal independent variables as instruments, thereby resolving the
problem of endogeneity. Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) and
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) argue that endogeneity makes
it hard to analyse relations between board composition and firm
value, and so if  this is not controlled, the results could  generate
errors and inconsistent estimations. In this work, potential endo-
geneity could be  due to  the problem of simultaneity or inverse
causality (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003) and therefore, in  accor-
dance with prior studies, we  have included the percentage of
non-executive directors within the total number of board mem-
bers as sources of endogeneity (Andrés de, Valentín, & Félix, 2005;
Jackling & Johl, 2009; Kim, 2007; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009;
Pombo & Gutiérrez, 2011). We used the Stata/SE software pro-
gramme  to calculate all of our estimations.
We  also considered the possible problems of heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation. In order to  establish if there was  a  problem
of heteroscedasticity we  carried out a  modified Wald test, which
rejected the H0 absence of heteroscedasticity, and we therefore
selected the robust option in Stata for all of our models. To control
for autocorrelation, we ran the Wooldridge test, using the xtserial
command in Stata. The H0 absence of correlations was  rejected, and
the test therefore indicated that there was a problem of autocorre-
lation to be corrected.
We  consider our model to be  “autoregressive” and have there-
fore included the lagged dependent variable (ROAt−1)  as the
instrument, but the lagged dependent variable was  intrinsically
correlated to the non-observed effects at panel level, giving incon-
sistent standard estimators for the linear regression models for the
random and fixed effects. This supports our use of the GMM  method
(Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Greene, 2003).
sector, we have assigned “1” to industries 1, 4, 5 and 6; “2” to  industry 2; and “3” to
industry 3.
To test the validity of the model specification when using GMM,
the Hansen Statistic of overidentifying restrictions was applied
to  evaluate the lack of correlation between the instruments and
the terminal error in  all of our models. The acceptance of  the H0
Hansen statistic implies the absence of any correlation between
the instruments used and the terminal error in  all of our models.
We  also included the m2 statistic, which enabled us to confirm the
absence of any secondary-order serial correlation in  the regression
residuals. Further to these comparative specification tests, we
included the following Wald tests in the estimations: first (z1) joint
significance of the reported coefficients of the explanatory variables
and second (z2) joint significance of the dummy  time variables. Both
were statistically significant.
Table 1 sets out the descriptive statistics and the correla-
tion matrix for the variables. The variables used in the model
were not  strongly correlated either between themselves or  with
the control variables, and there were therefore no problems of
multicollinearity. In order to  avoid the possible problems
of multicollinearity between the primary effects and interaction
terms, the independent variables were centred before the interac-
tion variables were created (Aiken & West, 1991).
Results
The results obtained are set out below (Tables 2 and 3). Model 1
is the base model that  includes all of the control variables. Curiously,
none of the variables, with the exception of firm size, are significant.
As  can be observed, our results confirm our two proposed work-
ing hypotheses. With regard to hypothesis 1, models 2  and 3
confirm that the inverted-U relation between interlocks and firm
performance is  only significant when we include the total num-
ber of interlocks rather than the number of ties belonging only
to the non-executive directors. In model 3, the estimated coeffi-
cient for the total number of interlocks was statistically significant
(p <  .01) with a  positive value, while the total number of  interlocks
was statistically significant (p <  .05) with a negative value.
Model 4 includes the moderating variable, board tenure. The
table shows that the board tenure coefficient is statistically sig-
nificant (p <  .01), with a  positive value. The squared term of the
interlocks was  negative and significant (p <  .01). The linear interac-
tion term for tenure and the interlocks was  negative and significant
(p <  .01), and the squared interaction term (p <  .01) was positive and
significant.
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Table  3
Results of the moderating effect of average board tenure on  the relationship between
total interlocks and firm performance.
Model 4
Board tenure 2.94***
Total interlocks 3.41***
Total interlocks2 −3.12***
Total interlocks*board tenure −2.95***
Total interlocks2*board tenure 2.95***
ROAt−1 1.70
*
CEO/chair duality 0.70
Board size 0.43
Firm age −4.14***
% of non-executive directors 0.71
Log firm size −1.61
Industry effect YES
Annual effect YES
Z1 24.29
***
Z2 24.48
***
m2 0.94
Hansen 6.12
X2 41.76***
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Therefore, in  relation to hypothesis 2,  we can confirm the
moderating effect of board tenure on the negative relation between
a high total number of interlocks and firm performance. However,
and although it was not predicted in our hypothesis, this mod-
erator effect also exists in the positive relation between a  small
total number of interlocks and firm performance. In comparison
to model 3, adjusted model 4 is  fairly significant, producing an
increase in the value of X2, which suggests that board tenure mode-
rates the curvilinear effects of the total number of interlocks on
performance.
Conclusions
Unlike agency theory, which argues that a  high percentage of
non-executive directors is required to fulfil the board’s control
function, more recent theories have focused on the search for
qualified and competent directors, regardless of type. However,
with regard to  interlocks, the majority of authors have concentrated
exclusively on the study of the non-executive directors’ ties (Kim,
2007; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian et al., 2011) to  compensate
for the executive directors’ lack of business experience or external
contacts (Filatotchev, 2006). On the other hand, from the resource
dependency perspective, with its focus on the capture of resources
for the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), the essential aspects have
been board size – if the number of board members rises, the oppor-
tunity to capture external resources also increases – and diversity
within the board, since more diverse boards have access to a
broader range of resources. Logically, these two  variables also affect
board composition. Our study demonstrates that another variable
– less explored and of greater interest for explaining the influence
of the board on a  firm’s results – is  the consideration of the board
as a single entity, which does not take account of board member
type when analyzing their potential for establishing external links.
In fact, the results obtained in our investigation (a comparison of
models 2 and 3) demonstrate the need to view the board as a single
entity.
Our models 3 and 4 also support our predictions. If a board
wishes to be more efficient, it should increase the number of
interlocks. However, increasing the number of these ties could
also have a negative effect on the board’s internal functioning, as
the group’s cohesion might be reduced when board members are
forced to divide their energies and attention between too many
responsibilities. The board will therefore achieve its greatest pro-
ductive efficiency when it has not only access to the greatest
possible number of resources but is also able to  function as
a  compact social group when taking decisions. We argue that
internal relations, through board tenure, moderate the negative
effects caused by a  high number of board interlocks, and high-
light the need to view the board as a  decision-making body.
Furthermore, although it was not predicted in our  hypotheses,
the results also show that board tenure moderates the positive
relation between a  low number of external links and firm per-
formance. Directors with an appropriate/non-excessive number
of ties and who therefore have more time to dedicate to  their
own board will be negatively influenced by a long tenure with
the firm. A possible explanation that  has not previously been con-
sidered is  that if the two  elements are combined (a lot of time
to  dedicate to the board and long tenure), directors could be
affected by their own  beliefs and the schemes that have been devel-
oped within their firm, and therefore the resources acquired in
other firms could become a  less valuable resource. That is to say,
the board members could start to  be more affected by a  set of
behaviour patterns learned in  their own firm than by  the knowl-
edge that they acquire from the firms on whose boards they serve.
Executive directors will only be able to take decisions that are
defined by these patterns and the abilities of non-executive direc-
tors to  provide resources and offer advice to the management team
will be reduced.
In  the majority of cases, the difficult balance between board
independence and the board’s social capital (via interlocks) can
vary, depending on the context and type of firm, which suggests
that future investigations should focus on these aspects. For exam-
ple, firms operating in dynamic markets, or which face an initial
public offering (IPO), should pay particular attention to their human
and social capital requirements in  relation to  the strict indepen-
dence of their non-executive directors (Filatotchev, 2006; Kor &
Sundaramurthy, 2009).  Other possible future lines of investiga-
tion could look in  greater detail at the nature of interlocks. In
this study, we have only considered national interlocks, between
Spanish firms. It would be of interest to see whether the effects
on performance of interlocks with foreign firms differ from those
identified in this study, or even how this would affect the other
dependent variables, such as the firm’s internationalisation. Entry
into new markets, or setting up subsidiaries in international mar-
kets, brings significant benefits for the firm’s growth. These also
tend to  be complex operations, given the high levels of uncer-
tainty and risk of failure associated with them (Sanders & Carpenter,
1998). In  this context, interlocks constitute a  very important
tool that gives board members the opportunity to access infor-
mation that mitigates risks and allows them to seek information
from other firms. Finally, we would point out that this work does
not specify whether the interlocks are “intragroup” – ties between
firms belonging to a  particular group, with shared ownership or
even overlapping activities – or are interlocks between firms that
are completely independent of each other with regard to their
ownership structure. This distinction might affect our results.
References
Adler, P. S., &  Kwon, S. W.  (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a  new concept. Academy
of  Management Review, 27, 17–40.
Aguilera, R., &  Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2009). Codes of good governance. Corporate Gov-
ernance: An  International Review,  17,  376–387.
Aiken, L.  S., &  West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interac-
tions.  Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Andrés de,  P.,  Valentín, A., &  Félix, L. (2005). Corporate boards in OECD countries:
Size, composition, functioning and effectiveness. Corporate Board, 13, 197–210.
Arellano, M.,  & Bond, S.  (1991). Some  tests of specification for panel data: Monte
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic
Studies,  58, 277–297.
Document downloaded from http://www.elsevier.es, day 09/07/2018. This copy is for personal use. Any transmission of this document by any media or format is strictly prohibited.
136 L.  Pérez-Calero Sánchez, C. Barroso-Castro / Revista Europea de Dirección y Economía de la  Empresa 24 (2015) 130–137
Arellano, M.,  & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation
of  error-components models. Journal of  Econometrics,  68, 29–51.
Barroso, C., Villegas, M.  M.,  & Pérez-Calero, L. (2011). Board influence on a
firm  internationalization. Corporate Governance: An International Review,  19,
351–367.
Beckman, C. M.,  & Haunschild, P. R. (2002). Networks learning: The effects of
partner’s heterogeneity of experience on corporate acquisitions. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 47, 92–124.
Bjornali, E. S., & Gulbrandsen, M.  (2010). Exploring board formation and evolution
of  board composition in academic spin-offs. Journal of Technology Transfer, 35,
92–112.
Burt, R. D., & Carlton, D. S.  (1989). Another look at the network boundaries of Amer-
ican  markets. The American Journal of  Sociology,  93,  723–753.
Calof, J. L. (1993). The mode choice and change decision process and its impact on
international performance. International Business Review, 2, 97–120.
Certo, S. T. (2003). Influencing initial public offering investors with prestige:
Signaling with board structures. Academy of  Management Review, 28, 432–446.
Dalziel, T., Gentry, R. J., &  Bowerman, M.  (2011). An integrated agency – resource
dependence view of the influence of directors’ human and relational capital on
firms’  R&D spending. Journal of  Management Studies, 48, 1217–1242.
Datta, D. K., Musteen, M.,  &  Herrmann, P. (2009). Board characteristics, managerial
incentives, and the choice between foreign acquisitions and international joint
ventures. Journal of  Management,  35, 928–953.
Davis, G. F. (1991). Agents without principles? The  spread of the poison pill
through the intercorporate network. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36,
583–613.
Diestre, L., Rajagopalan, N., &  Dutta, S. (2014). Constraints in acquiring and utilizing
directors’ experience: An empirical study of new-market entry in the pharma-
ceutical industry. Strategic Management Journal, http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj
Elitzur, R., & Yaari, V. (1995). Executive incentive compensation and earnings manip-
ulation in a multi-period setting. Journal of  Economic Behavior and Organization,
26,  201–219.
Ellstrand, A. E., Tihanyi, L., & Johnson, J.  L.  (2002). Board structure and international
political risk. Academy of  Management Journal,  45,  769–777.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M.  C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of
Law & Economics, 26,  301–326.
Ferris, S., Jagannathan, M.,  &  Pritchard, A.  C. (2003). Too busy to mind the busi-
ness?  Monitoring by  directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of
Finance,  58, 1087–1112.
Filatotchev, I. (2006). The effects of executive characteristics and venture capital
involvement on  board composition and share ownership in IPO firms. British
Journal of Management,  17,  75–92.
Filatotchev, I., Dynomina, N., Wright, M.,  &  Buck, T. (2001). Effects of postprivatiza-
tion governance and strategies on export intensity in the former Soviet Union.
Journal International Business Studies, 32, 853–871.
Finegold, D., Benson, G., &  Hecht, D. (2007). Corporate boards and company perfor-
mance: Review of research in light of recent reforms. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 15,  865–878.
Fligstein, N. (1995). Networks of power or the finance conception of control? Com-
ment on Palmer, Barber, Zhou and Soysal, American Sociological Review,  60,
500–503.
Forbes, D. P., & Milliken, F. J.  (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: Under-
standing boards of directors as strategic decision making groups. Academy of
Management Review,  24, 489–505.
Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M.  (2004). Context, behavior and evolution: Challenges in
research on boards and governance. International Studies of Management and
Organization, 34,  11–36.
Goerzen, A., & Beamish, P. W.  (2005). The effect of alliance network diversity
on  multinational enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26,
333–354.
Golden, B. R., & Zajac, E.  J.  (2001). When will boards influence strategy? Inclination
X power = strategic change. Strategic Management Journal,  22, 1087–1111.
Greene, W.  (2003). Econometric analysis (5th ed.). Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River.
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., & Zaheer, A.  (2000). Strategic networks. Strategic Management
Journal, 21, 203–215.
Haynes, K. T., & Hillman, A.  (2010). The effect of board capital and CEO power on
strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 31,  1145–1163.
He, J., & Huang, Z. (2011). Board informal hierarchy and firm financial performance:
Exploring a tacit structure guiding boardroom interactions. Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, 54,  1119–1139.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M.  S. (2000). Board of directors as an endogenously deter-
mined  institution: A survey of the literature. Working paper. University of California
at Berkeley and University of Illinois.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M.  S.  (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously
determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy
Review,  9, 7–26.
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., &  Paetzold, R.  (2000). The resource dependence role
of  corporate directors strategic adaptation of board composition in response to
environmental change. Journal of  Management Studies,  37, 235–255.
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Inte-
grating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management
Review,  28,  383–396.
Holm, C., & Schuler, F. (2010). Reduction of asymmetric information through corpo-
rate  governance mechanisms –  The  importance of ownership dispersion and
exposure toward the international capital market. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 18,  32–47.
Jackling, B., &  Johl, S. (2009). Board structure and firm performance: Evidence
from India’s top companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17,
492–509.
Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R.  E., &  Hitt, M.  A. (1993). Board of director involvement
in restructuring: The effects of board versus managerial controls and character-
istics.  Strategic Management Journal, 14, 33–50 (número especial).
Johnson, S.,  Schnatterly, K., Bolton, J.  F., &  Tuggle, C. (2011). Antecedents of new
director social capital. Journal of Management Studies,  48,  1782–1803.
Johansen, R.  T., & Pettersson, K. (2013). The impact of board interlocks on audi-
tor choice and audit fees. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21,
287–310.
Kaymak, T., &  Bektas, E. (2008). East meets west? Board characteristics in an emerg-
ing market: Evidence from Turkish banks. Corporate Governance: An International
Review,  16,  550–561.
Knockaert, M., &  Ucbasaran, D. (2013). The  service role of outside boards in high tech
start-ups: A resource dependency perspective. British Journal of Management, 24,
69–84.
Knockaert, M.,  Bjornali, E. S.,  & Erikson, T.  (2014). Joining forces: Top management
team  and board chair characteristics as antecedents of board service involve-
ment. Journal of  Business Venturing,  30, 420–435.
Kiel,  G. C., &  Nicholson, G. J.  (2006). Multiple directorships and corpo-
rate performance in Australian listed companies. Corporate Governance, 14,
530–546.
Kim, Y., &  Cannella, A. A., Jr. (2008). Toward a social capital theory of director selec-
tion.  Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16,  282–293.
Kim, Y. (2005). Board network characteristics and firm performance in Korea. Cor-
porate Governance: An International Review, 13, 800–808.
Kim, Y.  (2007). The proportion and social capital of outside directors and their
impacts on firm value: Evidence from Korea. Corporate governance: An Inter-
national Review, 15, 1168–1176.
Kor, Y., &  Misanyi, V. (2008). Outside directors ‘industry-specific experience and
firm’s  liability of newness. Strategic Management Journal,  29, 1345–1355.
Kor, Y., & Sundaramurthy, C. (2009). Experience-based human capital and social
capital of outside directors. Journal of Management, 35, 981–1006.
Kroll, M., Walters, B., &  Son, A. L. E.  (2007). The  impact of boards composition and
top  management team ownership structure on  post-IPO performance in young
entrepreneurial firms. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 1198–1216.
Kroll, M.,  Walters, B., &  Wright, P. (2008). Board vigilance, director experience, and
corporate outcomes. Strategic Management Journal, 29,  363–382.
Le, S. A., Kroll, M.  J., &  Walters, B.  A.  (2013). Outside directors’ experience, TMT
firm-specific human capital, and firm performance in entrepreneurial IPO firms.
Journal of Business Research, 66,  533–539.
Letza, S., Sun, X. P.,  & Kirkbride, J. (2004). Shareholding versus stakeholding: A critical
review of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
12,  242–262.
Lynall, M.  D., Golden, B. R., & Hillman, A.  J.  (2003). Board composition from adoles-
cence  to maturity: A multitheoretic view. Academy of  Management Review,  28,
416–431.
McIntyre, M.,  Murphy, S.,  &  Mitchell, P. (2007). The top team: Examining board com-
position and firm performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
7,  547–561.
Mizruchi, M. S., &  Stearns, L.  B. (1988). A longitudinal study of the formation of
interlocking directorates. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 194–210.
Mizruchi, M.  S., & Stearns, L. B. (1994). A longitudinal study of borrowing by large
American corporations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 118–140.
Nahapiet, J., &  Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital and the organi-
zation advance. Academy of  Management Review, 23,  242–266.
Ocasio, W.  (1994). Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession
in U.S. industrial corporations. 1960–1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39,
285–314.
Ortiz, N., Aragón, J., Delgado, J., &  Ferrón, V. (2012). The  effect of director interlocks
on  firms’ adoption of proactive environmental strategies. Corporate Governance:
An International Review,  164–178.
Palmer, D., Barber, B.  M.,  &  Xueguang, X. (1995). The finance concept of control “the
theory that ate New York?” Reply to Fligstein. American Sociological Review, 60,
504–508.
Pfeffer, J., &  Salancik, G. (1978). The external control of  organizations: A resource
dependence perspective.  New York: Harper y  Row.
Pombo, C.,  &  Gutiérrez, L.  H. (2011). Outside directors, board interlocks and firm
performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups. Journal of
Economics and  Business, 63, 251–277.
Sanders, G., &  Carpenter, M. A. (1998). Internationalization and firm  governance: The
roles of CEO compensation, top team composition and board structure. Academy
of  Management Journal, 41, 158–178.
Shropshire, C. (2010). The  role of the interlocking director and  board receptivity in
the  diffusion of practices. Academy of Management Review, 35, 246–264.
Shipilov, A., Greve, H., &  Rowley, T. (2010). When do interlocks matter? Institutional
logics and the diffusion of multiple corporate governance practices. Academy of
Management Journal,  53, 846–864.
Singla, C., George, R., & Eliyaht, R. (2010). Internationalization, family business and
corporate governance: An  emerging market perspective. In Academy of  manage-
ment annual meeting proceedings , p1.
Stevenson, W.,  & Radin, R. F. (2009). Social capital and social influence on the board
of directors. Journal of Management Studies, 46, 16–44.
Stiles, P.,  &  Taylor, B. (2001). Boards at  work: How directors view their roles and
responsibilities.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Document downloaded from http://www.elsevier.es, day 09/07/2018. This copy is for personal use. Any transmission of this document by any media or format is strictly prohibited.
L.  Pérez-Calero Sánchez, C. Barroso-Castro /  Revista Europea de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa 24 (2015) 130–137 137
Tian, J., Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, N. (2011). The effects of board human and social
capital on investor reactions to new CEO selection. Strategic Management Journal,
32,  731–747.
Van Ees, H., Gabrielsson, J., &  Huse, M.  (2009). Toward a behavioral theory of boards
and corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17,
307–319.
Westphal, J. D., & Fredrickson, J.  W.  (2001). Who  directs strategic change? Director
experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy. Strategic
Management Journal, 22, 1113–1137.
Westphal, J.  D., Seidel, M-D. L., &  Stewart, K. J. (2001). Second-order imitation: Uncov-
ering  latent effects of board network ties. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46,
717–743.
Wincent, J., Anokhin, S.,  &  Boter, H. (2009). Network board continuity and effec-
tiveness of open innovation in Swedish strategic small-firm networks. R&D
Management,  39, 55–67.
Zahra, S.  A., Priem, R. L., &  Rasheed, A. A.  (2007). Understanding the causes and effects
of top management fraud. Organizational Dynamics, 36,  122–139.
Document downloaded from http://www.elsevier.es, day 09/07/2018. This copy is for personal use. Any transmission of this document by any media or format is strictly prohibited.
